the ego and his own

Arguments Against ‘Humanitarian Intervention’

2007-05-03T08:47:00.000Z

At first glance the title of this paper seems relatively unproblematic. One would expect, I assume, that an essay entitled Arguments Against ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ would focus on the diverse yet well-rehearsed debates about military intervention for humanitarian ends. Humanitarian intervention is generally understood as ‘the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied’ (Holzgrefe, 2003: 18). Some scholars would argue that this definition is too narrow as it ignores non-state actors and alternatives to military-force (see Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1996). Nonetheless, as a working definition, it is respectable enough.

The unproblematic appearance of title, however, is merely superficial. It does in fact mask a salient and potentially fruitful ambiguity which will underpin my argument against ‘humanitarian intervention’. Rather than discuss “humanitarian intervention” as representative of a specific action within the usual boundaries of academic debate, I will focus on “humanitarian intervention” as a discourse or a ‘regime of truth’, which imposes critical limits upon our ability to think politically about the particular problems faced (Foucault, 1977: 131). I will argue that the discourse of humanitarian intervention is temporally and spatially distorting, forcing us to focus on instances of crisis bound-up within a specific time and geographical framework. The narratives of humanitarian action/inaction in places like Kosovo, Somalia and Rwanda rely upon artificial constructs that provide a perverted understanding of “reality” and simply reify existing structures, boundaries and distinctions between “us” and “them”. In order to expose and overcome the problems inherent to the discourse, we must draw on the scholarship of feminist, post-structuralists and critical geo-politicists. By taking seriously the theoretical criticisms raised we can begin to understand the true ethico-political implications of our policies and actions. As Jean Elshtain argues,

Contesting the discursive terrain that identifies and gives meaning to what we take these realities to be does not mean one grants a self-subsisting, unwarranted autonomy to discourse; rather it implies a recognition of the ways in which received doctrines… may lull our critical faculties to sleep, blinding us to the possibilities that lie within our reach (1992: 276)

Humanitarian Intervention: Theory and Practice Since 1945

The post-1945 era of international politics was initially heralded as a great departure from the horrors that had gone before. The United Nations was formed to provide collective security for the world and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights both sought to ensure that the horrors of the Nazi death camps were never repeated. ‘For the first time in the history of modern international society’, as Nicholas Wheeler argues, ‘the domestic conduct of governments was now exposed to scrutiny by other governments, human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations’ (2002: 1). However, the implementation and enforcement of these covenants was hampered by a variety of factors, particularly the paralysis that stemmed from the Cold War stand-off.

Arguments against humanitarian intervention usually stem from the pluralist camp, which incorporates a variety of legal, ethical and political perspectives generally revolving around the notion that humanitarian intervention violates the ‘cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the use of force’ (Wheeler, 2002: 11). In this respect we can clearly see the links to early thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Emer de Vattel, who argued that intervention violates a states right to liberty and autonomy (see Holzgrefe, 2003: 27). The pluralist position is advocated most articulately by the English School. They argue that order and justice are not mutually exclusive but bound up together and thus the maintenance of the principle of non-intervention is crucial for order in the state system. Hedley Bull expresses concern about imposing a principle of humanitarian intervention as it goes against the collective will of international society. He argues that, ‘we have a rule of non-intervention because unilateral intervention threatens the harmony and concord of the society of sovereign states’ (Bull, 1984: 195). Similar sentiments are expressed by Adam Roberts, who contends that the principle of non-intervention serves to limit the potential for war and fosters respect for different societies (1993: 434). It is no surprise then that pluralists, such as Roberts and Bull, are quick to highlight the importance of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter.

The threats to the stability of international society that the principle of humanitarian intervention poses are forcefully articulated by realist critics. Realists argue that states will only intervene if it serves their own interests and thus the humanitarian justifications are merely a ploy to legitimise their action. Noam Chomsky is particularly vocal on this matter, especially in relation to America’s selective and hypocritical record on human rights (see Chomsky, 1999; 2003). The danger of an enshrined principle of humanitarian intervention is that it is open to abuse by strong and powerful states (Ayoob, 2002: 92). Another objection from realists concerns whether or not it is morally permissible for states to risk the lives of their own troops in order to protect citizens of other countries (see Huntington, 1992). At the root of this argument is the communitarian assumption that states have an overriding obligation to protect their own citizens.

Contrary to the pluralist position is the one advocated by solidarists. The solidarist position, as Wheeler explains, entails the notion that ‘states accept not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their own citizens, but also the wider one of “guardianships of human rights everywhere”’ (2002: 12). Whereas pluralists take state sovereignty to be an absolute, solidarists draw upon more cosmopolitan assumptions and argue that sovereignty can be forfeited if states violate the human rights of their citizens (see Beitz, 1979). R.J. Vincent, for example, argues that whilst the principle of non-intervention is crucial to international society, we ‘should not make the mistake of supposing that any crossing of frontiers is unlawful, for there may be circumstances in which it is both lawful and moral to intervene’ (1974: 16). Stanley Hoffmann argues then that ‘military intervention is justified when domestic turmoil threatens regional or international security and when massive violations of human rights occur’ (1995: 29).

Liberal solidarists rely heavily on the inherent conflict between the internal and external understanding of state sovereignty. Fernando Tesón argues that the ‘major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights’ and so ‘governments and others in power who seriously violate those rights undermine the one reason that justifies their political power, and thus should not be protected by international law’ (2003: 93). The argument is rooted in liberal social contract theory and its requirement to protect it citizens. Whilst Tesón respects the external understanding of state-sovereignty, it is underwritten by a notion that states which violate their internal claims to legitimacy also violate their external claims. Kofi Annan has expressed similar sentiments regarding the UN Charter, which he argues ‘was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity’ (1999: 6). Bhikhu Parekh goes as far as to suggest that the humanitarian intervention regime of the 1990s subverts traditional notions of state sovereignty by insisting that ‘our common humanity and the concomitant duty under circumstances [insists that we] disregard the state’s autonomy and intervene in its internal affairs’ (1997a: 137; 1997b). Underlying these arguments, however, is a dangerous paradox that imposes critical limits on our ability to transcend the dilemma of humanitarian intervention. Whilst they claim to subvert these orthodox understandings, they simultaneously (re)produce notions of state sovereignty by their limited spatial-temporal focus, privileging of the state as an actor and the reification of boundaries between “us” and “them” (see Malmvig, 2001). As David Campbell argues,

The problem of responsibility—how response-ability can be fostered and exercised—is exacerbated by the way in which the normal foundations for ethical considerations in International Relations—sovereign states in an anarchic realm—are often the very objects of violence in such contexts, and can no longer be theoretically considered sufficient basis for resolution, even if their illusory permanence remains efficacious within the political discourse (1994: 456)

Whilst the post-war years may have been heralded as a new era for human rights, the celebrations were short-lived as it was soon apparent that the Cold War stand-off had paralysed the Security Council. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War released the UN from the shackles of geopolitical posturing and ushered in new norms about the legality and morality of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2003: 139; ICISS, 2001: 3). Drawing the theoretical contributions of constructivism, Wheeler argues that within international society there is a new consensus on the ethical and political duty to intervene to protect people from genocide and human rights abuses (Wheeler, 2003; see also Finnemore, 1996: 154). This notion of a renewed international solidarism does, ostensibly, seem to reflect in the acts and rhetoric of states and international organisations. Tony Blair, for example, argued that the Kosovo war marked a significant departure from previous conflicts in that it was a ‘just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values’ (Blair, 1999). The renewed focus on humanitarianism prompted Michael Ignatieff to declare the onset of a post Cold War ‘narrative of compassion’ (1999: 4). Underneath this solidarist spirit seemed to be a drive toward a more cosmopolitan ethic (Kaldor, 2006: 119). The roots of the cosmopolitan ethic have been linked to the development of a global civil society in a globalised world. Martin Shaw, for example, argues that the media has played a crucial role by ‘putting leaders on the spot, linking them directly to the visible plight of the miserable refugees, putting the victims’ accusations against the powerful’ (1996: 87). However, the media also plays a major role in reinforcing the limited temporal and spatial discourse of humanitarian intervention. The manner in which humanitarian crises are framed by the media, shows them to be discrete events in faraway places, replaying the same images over and over again (see Carruthers, 2000). The representation of these events reproduces the geo-political space of the Other and reinforces the mythical divide between “us” and “them”. Crises seem to resemble random disasters and thus our ability to truly explore the ethical and political role we have played is limited. As Pierre Bourdieu argues,

This vision is at once dehistoricised and dehistoricising, fragmented and fragmenting. Its paradigmatic expression is the TV news and the way it sees the world—as a series of apparently absurd stories that all end up looking the same, endless parades of poverty-stricken countries, sequences of events that, having appeared with no explanation, will disappear with no solution—Zaire today, Bosnia yesterday, the Congo tomorrow’ (1998: 7)

A variety of legal scholars have backed the claims made by English School constructivists by pointing to what they argue is a customary law in favour of intervention on humanitarian grounds. Thomas Franck, for example, argues that ‘international law… has begun gingerly to develop ways to bridge the gap between what is requisite in strict legality and what is generally regarded as just and moral’ (2003: 214). The pre-eminence of Article 2(4) in the UN Charter has been eroded somewhat by the notion that state autonomy must rest upon a responsibility to its citizens. The shift in the culture of international law is manifest, according to the proponents of a new customary law, in the manner in which states dealt with the various cases of intervention in the 1990s. Wheeler argues, for example, that Resolution 688, whilst not explicitly authorising intervention, was tacitly accepted by the international community as providing legitimate grounds for action (2003: 153-154). Wheeler refers to the unprecedented decision by the Security Council to authorise intervention in Somalia (Resolution 794), even though he does acknowledge that the Council was careful to ensure that the authorisation was considered “unique” and “exceptional” (2003: 172-186). The clearest example that legal scholars give to support the concept of a new customary law is in reference to the NATO action in Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite intervening without explicit justification from the UN, the NATO action was met with approval and acquiescence from the international community (Wheeler, 2003: 242). The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, for example, boldly concluded that ‘the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate’ (2000: 4).

The pluralist critics of humanitarian intervention have not, however, been silenced. Simon Chesterman has criticised both the existence and the desirability of a customary international law that favours intervention. In an essay with Michael Byers, Chesterman argues that these legal debates are Western-centric and marginalise the voices of non-Western legal scholarship (2003: 189-190). The new legal regime does not representative a normative shift but merely the ability of powerful states to impose their principles on weak states (Byers & Chesterman, 2003: 194). Chesterman pushes a forceful pluralist argument against changing the legal order, suggesting that enshrining principles of humanitarian intervention into law would enable states to abuse humanitarian intervention to further their own ends (Chesterman, 2002: 231). He does not, however, rule out the necessity of humanitarian intervention in certain circumstances but argues for the notion of ‘exceptional illegality’, where states can intervene providing they acknowledge they are breaking the law and justify why they need to break it (Byers & Chesterman, 2003: 198; Chesterman, 2002). The point Chesterman is making here closely resembles the argument made by Michael Walzer, who contends that the current legal order ensures that the burden of proof lies with the aggressor (1992: 86).

The solidarist moment of the 1990s has also been tainted in the eyes of pluralists by the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda, the withdrawal of American troops in Somalia and the tactics used in Kosovo. Even staunch advocates of the new-wave of humanitarian intervention have described their frustration at its mixed record of results (Kaldor, 2006: 120). The realist contention that states only act if they have interests at stake was allegedly shown by the West’s inaction to prevent genocide in Rwanda. Samantha Powers, for example, berated Western leaders, arguing that ‘the almost wilful delusion that what was happening in Rwanda did not amount to genocide created a nurturing ethical framework for inaction’ (2001; see also Melvern, 2000). Various other commentators have criticised NATO’s continued use of air strikes to wage these humanitarian wars, questioning whether the West is really committed to using its troops to help those in danger. Adam Roberts argues that, ‘the reluctance of NATO governments to risk the lives of their forces, the difficulty in developing a credible threat of land operations and, above all, the narrowness of the line between success and failure suggest that the many lessons to be drawn from these events should be on a more modest scale than any grand doctrines of humanitarian intervention’ (1999: 120). These specific criticisms are particularly acute in relation to Kosovo as there are questions over whether the air strikes actually resulted in a stepping up of the violence (see Chomsky, 1999; Ignatieff, 2000).

Debates about humanitarian intervention are often framed around the divide between pluralists and solidarists and, to some extent, it has been this divide that has shaped our understanding about the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention (Bellamy, 2003: 321). The dichotomy between pluralism and solidarism, however, is misleading as they both share and replicate the same underlying assumptions about sovereignty and the state-system. Whilst there is obviously a strong cosmopolitan element to the solidarist position, it would be mistaken to frame the debate as a divide between cosmopolitan and communitarian sentiments. As well as being misleading, the framing of the debate in dichotomous terms between pluralism and solidarisim or communitarianism and cosmopolitanism renders invisible a whole-host of alternative perspectives. R.B.J. Walker, for example, contests the persistent statism present in cosmopolitan thought, which seems to simultaneously undermine and reproduce the notion of the sovereign state (2003). Far from witnessing the disappearance of state sovereignty since the Cold War, we are merely seeing an ‘intensification of the problem of state sovereignty’ (Walker, 2003: 280). This paradox has been clearly shown with reference to humanitarian intervention and will be elaborated upon below.

The Limits of the Discourse of Humanitarian Intervention

Despite all the wild proclamations of a major shift in the international legal and political environment, the discourse remains incredibly conservative. The traditional assumptions of international politics are reproduced and imaginary spaces are reified and reinforced. The conservatism of the discourse is perpetuated, in part, by its incredibly limited scope, which focuses only on moments of crisis. This temporal blindness marginalises the plethora of historical factors that have contributed to the crisis itself, (re)producing a specific spatial distinction between “us” and “them” and fostering the illusion that we have a simple choice between doing something and doing nothing. It came as no surprise when Tony Blair declared to the nation that, in regards to Kosovo, we could “act or do nothing” (Blair quoted in Sylvester, 1999). This is what Anne Orford describes as the myopia of action and inaction (2003: 14-18). When confronted with a debate framed as such, ‘humanitarianism… [becomes] its own justification’ (de Waal quoted in Carruthers, 2000: 238). In this section I will build upon the criticisms I have already made against the discourse of humanitarian intervention by bringing in the perspectives of poststructuralists, feminists and critical geo-politicists. By highlighting the problematic nature of the discourse as it stands I will expose the need to transcend current narratives so that we may develop better means to explore and understand the crises and how best to engage with them.

Perhaps the most salient aspect of the humanitarian intervention discourse is the manner in which space, time and distance are represented. By limiting the focus of the debate to a specific crisis in an identifiable place, humanitarian intervention is constructed as a discrete and bounded act. However, this representation is both spatially and temporally distorted and distorting, as it imposes artificial boundaries between “us” and “them” and renders our presence in the crisis invisible. As Gearóid Ó Tuathail argues in the case of the crisis in the Balkans,

Bosnia, Bosnia, Bosnia is now everywhere. It is an ongoing series in our newspapers, a sound-bite on our television sets that occasionally splashes us with spectacular violence captured on videotape for our viewing pleasure. We can be there now by going to a U2 concert, clicking on a computer screen, by dialling up Sarajevo Online or netscaping to the Bosnia homepage. But this
Bosnia is also an official faraway place, a place that is physically close to ‘the West’ but actively produced in the foreign policy discourses of Britain, France, the USA and others as morally distant from it’ (1996a: 171-172)

The discourse relies upon what Orford describes as the ‘imaginary geography of humanitarian intervention’, which works to localise the Other and absolve the West of responsibility (2003: 82; see also Campbell, 1998a; 1993: 24-26; Carruthers, 2000: 231; Ó Tuathail, 1996b). By producing boundaries it is easy to locate responsibility at the feet of (an)Other and delineate between “us” and “them”. As Bellamy argues, ‘the idea that intervention is a discrete event suggests that the intervening states are not already implicated in the crisis they are intervening in’ (2003: 329). However, whilst the discourse inscribes and reifies these illusionary boundaries and notions of territorial space, it is imperative that we understand that these borders are not fixed and that space cannot be understood as geographically and territorially insulated (see Edkins, 2003: 257; Peterson, 1992). As Kaldor points out, ‘although these [civil] wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression and repression, or even local and global, are difficult to sustain’ (2006: 2). This point is also highlighted by the ICISS, which concluded that,

Intra-state warfare is often viewed, in the prosperous West, simply as a set of discrete and unrelated crises occurring in distant and unimportant regions. In reality, what is happening is a convulsive process of state fragmentation and state formation that is transforming the international order itself. Moreover, the rich world is deeply implicated in the process. Civil conflicts are fuelled by arms and monetary transfers that originate in the developed world, and their destabilising effects are felt in the developed world in everything from globally interconnected terrorism to refugee flows, the export of drugs, the spread of infectious disease and organised crime (2001: 5)

The illusion of our absence from the crisis prior to the actual instance of humanitarian intervention and the myopia of the action/inaction dichotomy become incredibly problematic once you begin to look beyond the limits of the discourse.

The debates over Rwanda replayed the same fantasies about the choice between action and inaction, presence and absence. By framing the crisis in this manner, however, it marginalises the role West played in creating the conditions that led to the genocide that resulted in the deaths of over 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Even if we leave aside the colonial legacy that fuelled, and arguably created, the tensions between Hutus and Tutsis, or the fact UN peacekeepers were already stationed in the country, the West had an enormous presence in the region (see Mamdani, 2001; Powers, 2001). Prior to the genocide, Rwanda was a model developing country and filled with foreign workers and advisors busy implementing the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP). As Orford argues, ‘the international community is already profoundly engaged in shaping the structure of political, social, economic and cultural life in many states through the activities of international economic institutions’ (2003: 109-110). Linda Melvern takes this argument even further by arguing that the funds being pumped into Rwanda by Western institutions and states helped make the conditions for genocide possible (2000: 4). She is particularly damning of the role of France, South Africa, Egypt and China played in selling weapons, including machetes and rocket launchers, to the Hutu militias (2000: 5). The same can be said about the situation in East Timor, where, despite New Labour’s “ethical foreign policy”, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had no qualms about issuing licences for the sale of British weapons to Indonesia (see Pilger, 1998; CAAT, 2001). The problems in Bosnia and Kosovo also cannot be simply represented as isolated and territorially-bounded events or as the result of simple primordial ethnic tensions (see Campbell, 1998a). Yugoslavia was, throughout the 1980s and 90s, subject the a variety of IMF and World Bank economic initiatives and restructuring which, according to Orford, increased feelings of insecurity and fuelled disintegration and nationalist sentiments (2003:89-96). As Bellamy argues, the background to the ‘crisis’ is usually given scant consideration and international society’s role in constructing that historical background is often ignored altogether’ (2003: 330). We must overcome the notion that these crises are within our ‘universe of obligation but not our universe of moral responsibility’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996a: 172).

One of the greatest dangers of constructing humanitarian crises as temporally and spatially discrete occurrences is that it replays colonial fantasies about the need for Western states to liberate developing people from themselves. De Waal, for example, argues that discourse about humanitarian aid simply deluded people into ‘believing the fairy tale that their aid can solve profound political problems, when it cannot’ (2002: 221). The same can be said for military intervention. The narrative of humanitarian intervention is imbrued with gendered imagery of the “Just Warrior” rescuing the passive and incapable “Beautiful Souls” (Elshtain, 1982; see also Orford, 2003: 171). Despite the massive presence the international community has in these crises, it is represented as the ‘humane saviour intervening to help people in trouble spots’ and as the ‘guarantors of stability, bearers of democracy and protectors of human rights and the oppressed’ (Orford, 2003: 165-167). The gendered, colonial imagery that permeates the discourse is inadvertently caricatured by the title of Chris Bellamy’s book on UN peacekeepers Knights in White Armour (1997). However, as Sandra Whitworth shows, this construction of the peacekeeper as the just warrior can be very difficult to maintain (2004). The portrayal of violence in humanitarian intervention, particularly in the era of post-modern, hyper-real virtual warfare, also plays a major part in the (mis)representation of international society as the just warrior. As James Der Derian argues, ‘virtuous wars promote a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars’, but by ‘resorting to virtual means to resolve political problems… we undermine the very ground upon which our political virtues rest’ (2001: xv, 202).

Conclusion

This paper began in a state of ambiguity, but I have shown how productive ambiguities can be. By continuing to operate within the current discourse of humanitarian intervention, we will continue to do injustice to our ability to critically reflect upon the ethico-political consequences of our actions in the world. Orthodox debates about the problems of humanitarian intervention simply reify and reinforce the existing assumptions about geo-political space and state sovereignty. By limiting the spatial and temporal focus to such a limited and distorted timeframe there is little chance of understanding the role international society plays in constructing the humanitarian crises. We simply end up with a narrative that is marked by the absence of international society until the moment of intervention and reproduces the gendered colonial fantasies of the West liberating the helpless souls of the Third World. By transcending the critical limits imposed by the discourse and by embracing ambiguities as they present themselves, academics, commentators and policy-makers can move beyond the myopia of the choice between action and inaction and look to the underlying structural, economic, social, historical and political factors that all play a role in creating humanitarian crises. Rather than continuing to do ‘violence to complex realities’, “humanitarians” need to re-engage politics and move beyond the dangerous realm of abstract moralising (Elshtain, 1992: 271; Campbell, 1998b; Campbell & Shapiro, 1999; Robinson, 1999; Vaughan-Williams, 2007).

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Guardian Article - Women Soldiers in Liberia

2006-07-07T15:16:00.000Z

The Guardian has published a fascinating article on the ever-increasing role of women in armed conflicts in the non-Western world. The article, which drew heavily upon the work of Irma Specht, explores the active and willing participation of women in the military. Rather than being forced into the army against their will, increasing numbers of women around the globe are engaging as a means to escape sexual inequality, poverty, violence and rape. Images of women voluntarily carrying guns deeply disturbs our traditional construction of war as a man's game.

'I wanted to take revenge' by Diane Taylor
This article can be found at http://www.guardian.co.uk/congo/story/0,,1814703,00.html

Suicide: an 'Act of War'?

2006-06-11T11:50:00.001Z

The breaking news of the suicides of three Guantanamo inmates has come as a serious blow to America and the continuing operation of its controversial detention camp. The despair and suffering that drove these inmates to such an act of desperation will probably come as no surprise to those who have experienced the camp at first hand or those who have continually argued for its closure. Indeed, the biggest shock to emerge from the set of events was the attempt by the camp commander to dismiss the deaths as acts of ‘asymmetrical warfare waged against [America]’.[1]

The comments made by Rear Admiral Harris, however, are the inevitable product of a discourse that has sought to demarcate the enemy and relegate them to an inferior moral sphere. The West’s construction of the War on Terror relies upon locating all responsibility for all evil at the feet of the Other, thus suppressing and excluding its own role in the problems that we face. The Slovenian academic Slavoj Žižek has highlighted the paradoxical nature of a discourse that de-legitimises any act perpetrated by the enemy, ensuring that ‘the enemy is criminalised if he defends himself and returns fire’.[2] It would now appear that even acts of suicide can not be considered legitimate or indeed innocent. America’s insistence of constructing their enemy as “unlawful combatants” existing outside of our moral space will only seek to distort our understanding of the events. The world cannot hope to find any form of resolution whilst it continues to naively pursue a policy of ignoring the West’s role in the perpetuation of violence.

Endnotes

[1] Rear Adm Harris quoted in BBC News (11/06/06) Guantanamo suicides 'acts of war', available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5068606.stm, accessed on the 11/06/06.
[2] S. Žižek, (2002) Are we at war? Do we have an enemy? available online at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n10/zize01_.html, accessed on the 11/06/06.

The (Private) Jessi(ca Lynch) Narrative

2006-06-08T16:52:00.000Z

It was like a Hollywood film. They cried 'go, go, go', with guns and blanks and the sound of explosions. They made a show – an action movies like Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan.[1]

Within a month of the Iraq war the world was gripped by story of Private Jessica Lynch’s capture and her subsequent rescue. The Pentagon steadily released the grainy night-vision footage, filmed by embedded cameramen, of Navy Seals and Army Rangers descending upon the Iraqi hospital. American troops stormed the compound, kicking in doors and leaving a ‘whole loft of dead Iraqis’.[2] “We’re United States soldiers and we’re here to protect you” her rescuers shouted, as if they were acting-out a badly scripted action-film.[3] The following day, Brig. Gen. Vince Brooks told the world defiantly, American soldiers “never leave a fallen comrade behind”.[4] The action-packed rescue, beamed to television screens around the globe, is a clear example of what James Der Derian has described as the ‘Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network’.[5]

In the days that followed more details dripped out about her ambush and captivity. The Washington Post faithfully rehashed the official version of events, running the front-page headline ‘She Was Fighting to the Death’.[6] The article described how Lynch ‘fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers… firing her weapon until she ran out of ammunition’.[7] The media was also rife with ‘unsettling questions about Lynch’s condition and her treatment in captivity’.[8] Officials had indicated to her family that ‘she had small-calibre, low-velocity entry and exit wounds’ to her body, suggesting that she may have been shot.[9] Reporters were also told that Lynch’s injuries ‘were consistent with possible anal sexual assault’.[10] This led to further speculation about whether or not Lynch had been subjected to sexual violence and possibly rape.[11]

However, the dominant framing of events collapsed after a series of investigations exposed the flaws in the narrative. Kampfner disputed the claim the hospital was guarded, claiming this was ‘one of the most stunning pieces of news management yet conceived’.[12] He reports the claims by Iraqi doctors that Lynch was treated well, occupying one of only two nurses on the ward and even receiving two bottles of blood donated by medical staff.[13] Lynch herself has even gone on record to criticise the way in which American officials and the media exaggerated the events and used it for propaganda purposes.[14] However, the most interesting perspective on the story is not to be found in the controversy over the “facts” but in how gender has been deployed in the construction of the armed services and Lynch herself.

The inclusion of women in the army has deeply unsettled the traditional protector identity of the military. Although women are still barred from combat units, their roles as mechanics, clerks, and cooks has led to the worrying prospect of them being injured, killed or even kidnapped by enemy troops. As Brant warns in Newsweek, the Jessica Lynch story raises the ‘grim spectre of women combat casualties’.[15] The blurring of the protector/protected hierarchy poses a direct threat to the military’s masculine identity.[16] This threat is all the more worrying for the military and elite as the response to 9/11 has been dependent upon a ‘remasculinization’ of the armed forces, with the War on Terror discourse based upon a tough, military response.[17] .

Although Lynch was presented to the world as an American hero, the manner in which her capture and rescue were framed means that she cannot be understood as a military hero. Instead, the representation of Lynch establishes her defencelessness. The media’s depiction of Lynch ‘fetishized [her] femininity and vulnerability’ by focusing on her small physical size and young age, with reports frequently referring to her as ‘petite’ and ‘tiny’. [18] The Evening Standard, for example, describes Lynch as a ‘teenager’, The Sun frequently used the noun ‘girl’ when talking about her, and Newsweek even went as far as to inform us that she was ‘the smallest member of her high-school basketball team’.[19] The rhetorical devices used in the media and by officials constructed Lynch as the ‘ultra feminine, vulnerable girl’, thus preserving the protector/protected identities.[20] Even the rumours of her heroics during the ambush were tainted with sexiest notions of women’s bravery. The framing of both the capture and the rescue of Lynch ‘simultaneously establish[es] her heroism and victimhood’ by undermining her bravery with symbols of vulnerability.[21] Ultimately, as Kumar argues, ‘despite her courage she is still in need of rescue by her male counterparts, the real heroes’.[22]

The masculine identity of the army is thus preserved, as at ‘the crucial moment of potential sacrifice, when she might perish at the hands of her captors, her feminine body and soul begged for protection’.[23] Although Lynch was in a battle zone as a member of the army, ‘she categorically stands for what the solider is protecting’ and therefore cannot be seen as a soldier herself.[24] She became nothing more than a damsel-in-distress metaphor for the innocence and purity of the Self in a war against the brutal Other.

The symbolic reinforcement of this protector/protected role for the military was further witnessed by the fact Lynch was ‘rhetorically stripped of her military identity’ by the media.[25] The representation of Lynch is distinct from that of male soldiers by an obsessive focus on her vulnerability. The speculation about her rape undermined her military role as a protector and instantaneously transformed her into an ordinary woman that required the protection of others. The image of sexual violence of an American women at the hands of the barbaric Other is a dramatic reaffirmation of the masculine protection role required of the military. Her feminine vulnerability was further represented in reports of her rescue that described how she ‘peeked out from under the sheets’.[26] As well as focusing on her beautiful looks and ‘petite’ appearance, the media constantly referred to Lynch as “Jessi” rather than by her surname or rank, as is the norm with military personnel.[27] Sanprie argues that by referring to her like this we were ‘prevented from understanding Lynch as a woman or as anything other than a girl’.[28] Constant focus upon her home-life, her family and her childhood dreams worked to further remove Lynch’s link to the army. Photographs of Lynch at home in her civvies transformed her from a soldier into the girl-next-door. The Express even quoted her kindergarten teacher upon her rescue.[29]

The construction of Lynch also acted as a metaphor for American society at large, symbolising the ‘American family under attack’.[30] ‘Rescuing the damsel in distress’, according to Anderson, ‘reasserted the male superiority and military paternalism, values essential to a culture of war being (re)constructed by highlighting fear of terrorism’.[31] Lynch was represented as a pure, innocent country-girl, with ‘country-fair-pageant-winning’ looks, signifying ‘maximum vulnerability’ by identifying her with the ‘American heartland’.[32] Kumar argues Lynch fits the mould of the ‘all-American girl’, as she is ‘blonde, blue-eyed, pretty, docile, yet spunky’.[33] Time, for example, informs us that her first requests upon rescue were ‘pink casts for her fractured legs and arm, a new hairbrush and a menu of turkey and steamed carrots’, describing her as ‘just a country girl’.[34] By invoking these images of America’s vulnerability through the construction of Lynch, Bush and the media were able to legitimise the patriarchal protection of the state, making ‘remilitarisation appear [to be] the only viable means to achieve security’.[35] It is interesting to note that the rescue of the overweight Black American Shoshana Johnson from captivity in Iraq and the tragic killing of Rachel Corrie, who was murdered protecting Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip, received relatively little media attention. Johnson, unlike Lynch, did not possess the Barbie-doll looks, whilst Corrie did not advocate the American values that were required.

Endnotes

[1] Dr. Anmar Uday, quoted in Kampfner, J. (15/5/2003) The Truth About Jessica, available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,956255,00.html, accessed on the 21/04/06
[2] Brant, M. (02/042003) ‘She’s Alive’, available online at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3068433/, accessed on 21/04/06
[3] Adler, J. (14/04/2003) Jessica’s Liberation, available online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3068589/site/newsweek/from/RL.3/, accessed on the 20/04/06
[4] Ibid.
[5] Der Derian, J. (2001) Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, Westview Press, Boulder
[6] Schmidt, S. & Loeb, V. (2003) She Was Fighting to the Death, in the Washington Post (03/04/2003), p1
[7] Ibid.
[8] Adler, Jessica’s Liberation
[9] Rescued POW was shot, doctors tell family (05/04/2003), available online at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/04/sprj.irq.lynch/index.html, accessed on the 21/04/06
[10] Gibbs, N. (17/11/2003) The Private Jessica Lynch Story, in Time, Vol.162, p38
[11] Jessica Lynch ‘Raped’ in Iraq (06/11/2003), available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3248021.stm, accessed on the 20/04/06
[12] Kampfner, The Truth About Jessica
[13] Ibid.
[14] Lynch: Military played up rescue too much (07/11/2003), available online at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/11/07/lynch.interview/, accessed on the 21/04/06
[15] Brant, ‘She’s Alive’
[16] Pin-Fat, V. & Stern, M. (2005) The Scripting of Private Jessica Lynch: Biopolitics, Gender, and the ‘Feminization’ of the U.S. Military, in Alternatives, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp25-33
[17] Takacs, S. (2005) Jessica Lynch and the Regeneration of American Identity and Power Post-9/11, in Feminist Media Studies, Vol. 5, No .3, p299
[18] Ibid. ; Kumar, D. (2004) War Propaganda and the Ab(Uses) of Women: Media Constructions of the Jessica Lynch Story, in Feminist Media Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, p300
[19] Dougherty, H. & Langton, J. (2003) The Saving of Jessica, in the Evening Standard (02/04/03); see for example: Flynn, B. (2003) Rescued, in the Sun (02/04/03), p1; Adler, Jessica’s Liberation
[20] Sanprie, V. (2005) Identity Cleft: Analysis of Identity Construction in Media Coverage of the Jessica Lynch Story, in Feminist Media Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, p389
[21] Kumar, War Propaganda and the Ab(Uses) of Women, p301
[22] Ibid. p302
[23] Pin-Fat & Stern, The Scripting of Private Jessica Lynch, p36
[24] Ibid. p42
[25] Howard & Prividera quoted in Takacs, Jessica Lynch and the Regeneration of American Identity and Power Post-9/11, p302
[26] Adler, Jessica’s Liberation
[27] See for example: Adler, Jessica’s Liberation; Gibbs, The Private Jessica Lynch Story; Bragg, R. (2004) I Am a Solider, Too: The Private Jessica Lynch Story, Vintage Books, London; Flynn, Rescued; Daring raid to rescue PoW Jessica, in the Express (02/04/2003); Walters, J. (2003) Spirited but weak, Jessi calls home, in the Express (02/03/2003)
[28] Sanprie, Identity Cleft, p389
[29] Walters, Spirited but weak, Jessi calls home
[30] Takacs, Jessica Lynch and the Regeneration of American Identity and Power Post-9/11, p301
[31] Anderson, R. (2005) Gendered Mead Culture and the Imagery of War, in Feminist Media Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, p368
[32] Ibid.; Mason, C. (2005) The Hillbilly Defense: Culturally Mediating U.S. Terror at Home and Abroad, in NWSA Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp44-45
[33] Kumar, War Propaganda and the Ab(Uses) of Women, p302
[34] Morse, J. (2003) Saving Private Jessica, in Time, Vol. 161, No. 15, p54; Gibbs, The Private Jessica Lynch Story, p41
[35] Takacs, Jessica Lynch and the Regeneration of American Identity and Power Post-9/11, p302

Gender Hierachies in IR: How the Realist Discourse Suppresses the "Feminine"

2006-06-07T10:24:00.000Z

Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.
Simone de Beauvoir

Although Beauvoir was not referring explicitly to the realist discourse of international politics, no other quotation most suitably sums up the feminist stance on Realism. The Realist school has dominated International Relations since the Second World War, and has formed the basis of foreign policy and academic research in the West. However, the challenge to its positivist epistemology and the changing nature of the international system since the end of the Cold War has resulted in a serious undermining of Realism, with feminism at the forefront of the mission to deconstruct and debunk its myths. This section aims to show how feminist critiques have exposed its inherent gender-bias, thus destroying its ability to claim it represents an impartial and objective view of the global system. Feminism has sought to expose realism as simply an ‘ideology that has served to legitimize and sustain [the] current order’ and our preoccupation with war.[1]

The first stage of the feminists attack on realism comes in the form of a challenge to its ‘creation myths’.[2] Post-structuralist Richard Ashley argues much of the International Relations discourse is based on ‘arbitrary political constructions that [are] always in the process of being imposed’.[3] Feminists have expanded this notion to show how these arbitrary politics constructions are heavily reliant upon “male” experience, creating a situation where we have ‘come accustomed to equating what is human with what is masculine’.[4] The positivist epistemology Realists rely upon is restrictive, coercive and hierarchical, as it is primarily focused on the “male”. [5] It paints an artificially constructed and incomplete picture of human nature by failing to take account of “female” experiences with the result that “male” experience is consistently privileged. Realism has effectively created a game where war is seen as inevitable.

Realist assumptions about the nature of states and their behaviour stem Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s descriptions of humans in a system with no government, which have then been projected onto the state. Hobbes’ abstract notion of a mythical state of nature asserts that when selfish ‘men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition that is called Warre’, with a life that is ‘nasty, brutish and short’.[6] The selfish nature of mankind has been used by Realists, such as Morgenthau, to explain the self-help nature of states, whereas neo-Realists have claimed the absence of a world Leviathan explains the structural pressures on states that force them into war.[7] However, what Hobbes imagined to be human nature is only a partial picture, as it renders women ‘invisible’.[8] Hobbes’ ideas are drawn entirely from a “male” perspective, and he takes no account of the experiences of women who must have been co-operating and creating life in their role as child-bearers.[9] Rousseau’s analogy of the stag-hunt, which has also been used by neo-Realists to explain the anarchical nature of international politics, would have reached drastically different conclusions, according to Grant, if women were included.[10] This claim gained further credibility following the publication of Gilligan’s study of playground behaviour, which emphasised the co-operative nature of girls.[11] The myths underpinning neo-realist claims that states are profit-maximisers are also dismissed by feminists. Tickner, for example, points out this abstraction is built entirely upon observations of men in the economic market place; a realm that has historically been marked by the absence of women.[12]

The emphasis on states within the realist school is also cause for concern, as they are also artificial constructions imbrued with “masculine” experiences. ‘The earliest practical source of gender bias’, according to Rebecca Grant, ‘dates back to the formation of the state two thousand years ago in Ancient Hellas’, where women were denied access to the public sphere and had no role in the creation or running of the state.[13] This separation of the sexes set in motion thousands of years of gender division, where women and the “feminine” were excluded from the public realm and international politics. The relationship between the creation of states and war further aggravated this gender divide, as the “warrior” man who fought to defend his state was rewarded with an ‘exclusive right of citizenship’, as evident in the works of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Machiavelli.[14] This idea of a higher citizenship is still of relevance today, as it is generally men who are entrusted with the protection of the state in their roles as soldiers and foreign policymakers, resulting in a continuation of “male” privilege.[15]

The prominence of “male” experience has led Grant to question the ‘epistemological basis of the discourse’, arguing that “masculine” traits are automatically associated with war.[16] Carol Cohn argues that language shapes and limits our perception of the world. In her study of US policymakers, she concludes that “male” language is the only one acceptable, resulting in a strong reliance on war as a policy option.[17] She claims that talk of the bloody reality of war is suppressed, and points how much of the discourse (e.g. the RAND war models) is constructed in such a way that warlike solutions are inevitable.[18] Tickner also highlights how we are socialised into believing that somehow men have some special affinity with Realpolitik.[19] She goes onto claim “masculine” models tend to ‘delegitimate other ways of behaving and make them appear less “realistic”’, resulting in “feminine” arguments being dismissed.[20] This claim is further supported by the former US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who spoke of her constant belittling by male colleagues.[21] The dominance of the “male” in the discourse and the realist reliance on binary constructions of reality result in the development of false dichotomies, with the systematic marginalisation of the “feminine”. Ashley has shown how these binary constructions impose a hierarchy which leads to certain norms having a ‘privileged’ status, and thus seen as a ‘higher reality’.[22] Feminists have shown these hierarchies elevate “masculine” concepts of war above those of a “feminine” nature, which are often seen as idealistic and irrational. The result is a discourse that is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, patently false. The “male” is ascribed with virtues of strength, power and rationality, and thus is continually associated arena of war. However, what is ironic is that this imagery requires the role of women in war to be rendered invisible.[23]

[1] Tickner, J. A. (1992) Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, Columbia University Press, New York pp20-21
[2] Grant, R. (1991) The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations Theory, in Grant & Newland Gender and International Relations p9
[3] Ashley, R. K. (1988) Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Critique in Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol.17, No. 2 p229
[4] Tickner, Gender in International Relations p6
[5] Keller, E. F. (1985) Reflections on Gender and Science, Yale University Press, New Haven ch3-4
[6] Hobbes, T. (1651/1985) Leviathan, Penguin Classics, London pp185-186
[7] Morgenthau, H. J. (1985) Politics Among Nations 6th Ed., McGraw-Hill, London; Waltz, K. N. (1959/2001) Man, the State, and War, Columbia University Press, New York p166
[8] Grant, The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations p10
[9] Ibid.
[10] Rousseau, J. J. (1754/1984) A Discourse on Inequality, Penguin Classics, London p111; Waltz, Man, the State, and War p167
[11] Grant, The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations p11
[12] Tickner, J. A. (2001) Gendering World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York p30, p52; Tickner, Gender in International Relations p283
[13] Grant, The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations pp11-12
[14] See Tilly, C. (1992) Coercion, Capital, and Other European States, AD990-1992, Blackwell, Oxford; Grant, The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations pp14-16
[15] Tickner, Gender in International Relations pp27-29
[16] Grant & Newland, Gender And International Relations p2
[17] Cohn, C. (1991), Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War in Cooke, M. & Woollacott, A. (eds) (1993) Gendering War Talk, Princeton University Press, New Jersey pp228-229
[18] Ibid pp233-234, pp237-238
[19] Tickner, Gender in International Relations pp4-5
[20] Tickner, Gendering World Politics p52
[21] Tickner, J. A. (1988) Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: a Feminist Reformulation in Grant & Newland, Gender And International Relations p27
[22] Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State pp229-230
[23] Enloe, C. (2000) Bananas, Beaches and Bases, University of California Press, London pp93-105

The (Re)Construction of Identity in the Animal Testing Debate

2006-05-25T16:42:00.000Z

The controversial decision by Tony Blair to sign the so-called People’s Petition is the culmination of weeks of renewed debate between antivivisectionists and those in support of animal testing. The resurgence of support for vivisection had been led by a group named Pro-Test, with mass support from Big Pharma, politicians and the media.

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics estimates that there are around 50 to 100 million animals currently being used worldwide for scientific and commercial experimentation, with 2.72 million animals used in the UK.[1] Whilst the use of primates is illegal in Britain, animals including birds, reptiles, fish and mammals are used in laboratories up and down the country. Vivisection has been fiercely opposed for many years by individuals and groups, such as Speak and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). The tactics used by some individuals and groups have been criticised for their violent and intimidating nature. However, the intense focus on the actions of a minority of protestors had distorted and suppressed the wider debate about the dubious benefits of animal testing.

The focus of this paper will not be on the scientific or moral debates about animal testing, but on how identity has been constructed and mobilised in order to marginalise and suppress dissent. I will argue that the identity of those opposed to animal testing has been constructed as being irrational, regressive and anti-science. They are placed in a logocentric dichotomy against supporters of testing, who are constructed as rational and enlightened. These constructions, however, rely upon a process of Foucauldian exclusion that marginalises critical evidence provided by a variety of scientific bodies and papers. If the discourse is to be taken at face value then those against animal testing would be considered as dangers to medicine and science. A closer reading, however, highlights that the debate is not as simple as this.

Construction of Identity

The dominant media construction of animal rights activists demarcates them as categorically opposed to science and progress, favouring the protection of animals over the advancement of the human race. The director of Europeans for Medical Progress argues the media ‘misrepresents animal testing opponents as “anti-science”’.[2] This is a point supported by Gill Langley, a scientific advisor to the Dr Hadwen Trust, who points to how antivivisectionists are portrayed as ‘misanthropic’.[3]

The construction of antivivisectionists as being anti-science rests on the representation of animal testing as necessary and essential. Tony Blair has offered his staunch support for the continuation of vivisection, claiming that there is ‘no alternative for the foreseeable future’.[4] The Daily Telegraph describes testing as a ‘necessary evil of scientific progress’, suggesting that opponents ‘abhor the rights of man’.[5] The Times takes a similar view, stating that,

It is essential that vital test on possible scientific breakthroughs go ahead. Those who, purporting to defend animals, would deny the chance of life or recovery to millions suffering from debilitating disease threaten not simply our laboratories; they threaten our very humanity.[6]

By demarcating antivivisectionists as anti-science and anti-medicine they are relegated to an inferior moral and scientific sphere. The discourse has been constructed in such a way that concern for animal welfare must always be overridden by notions of progress, necessity and scientific rationality.

The relegation of antivivisectionists is cemented further through the intense focus on the more extreme and controversial acts of protest. Although some groups engage in acts of violence and intimidation, justly or unjustly, the media and pharmaceutical companies have sought to construct them as representative of a whole raft of antivivisectionist groups. The Times, for example, describes the activists as ‘violent nihilists’ and the chief executive of GlaxoSmithKline plays into the wider War on Terror discourse by describing them as ‘terrorists’.[7] The Telegraph goes as far as to describe antivivisectionists as ‘sinful’, ‘wrong’ and ‘stupid’, contradicting ‘any normal account of core British values’.[8] Some reports go even further, describing the animal liberation movement as ‘cabbalistic’ and ‘monk-like’, rife with ‘fundamentalists’ that refuse to engage with non-vegans or in sexual activities.[9] Antivivisectionists are presented as a bizarre and primitive cult-like organisation that stands in opposition to all that is rational and scientific. This construction, however, excludes and marginalises a whole range of scientific and ethical criticism of the use of animal testing. The moral stance of the antivivisectionists is thus eroded by the incessant reporting of a few acts by a few individuals.

Bad Science

The intense media focus on the more extreme elements of the animal liberation movement, and the construction of them as anti-science, seeks to exclude and suppress the mass of scientific criticism of vivisection. These processes of Foucauldian exclusion marginalise concern about the validity of animal testing, allowing the continued representation of vivisection as undeniably essential and scientifically sound.

Supporters of animal experimentation are quick to highlight the contribution testing has made to medical progress throughout history. However, growing numbers of scientists and medical professionals are challenging the strength of animal testing. A report by the Medical Research Modernization Committee (MRMC) in 2002 concluded that animal testing was ‘inefficient and unreliable’ and that the alternatives on offer were ‘more valid and less expensive’.[10] Vivisection has undoubtedly contributed to many medical advancements, but we should also be aware that it has hindered progress in many cases. Our understanding of the dangers of asbestos, for example, was delayed for years by repeated failures to demonstrate the link between cancer and asbestos in animals.[11] The animal models used to study polio, cancer and AIDS have also misled scientists in their attempts to find appropriate cures.[12] The safety of drug-testing on animals has been called into question, especially in the wake of the TGN1412 trials which left six men seriously ill in hospital. Animal tests failed to highlight the link between the drugs fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine and heart valve abnormalities, and the liver failure caused by fialuridine.[13] A review of 198 drugs marketed between 1976 and 1985 found that 52% had ‘serious postapproval risks’.[14] The Dr Hadwen Trust and BUAV also highlight how, despite years of research, animal testing has failed to find suitable cures for strokes, Alzheimer’s, diabetes or Parkinson’s.[15] The Dr Hadwen Trust concluded that,

Pursuing a line of research on animals can produce conflicting or confusing results, of unknown relevance to human beings. This can have serious implications, at worst misleading researchers about an illness and delaying medical progress.[16]

The MRMC has even gone as far to question the necessity of animal research to the history of scientific progress, arguing that few have considered whether vivisection had ever, on balance, been helpful.[17] The John Hopkins Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing (CAAT) also points to the controversy over how essential animal tests were for various medical discoveries.[18] J. R. Paul’s review of polio research, for example, concluded that animal research caused both delays and insights.[19] This is a view supported Albert Sabin, the developer of the Sabin oral vaccine, who argued that,

Work on prevention was long delayed by an erroneous conception of the nature of the human disease based on misleading experimental models of the disease in monkeys.[20]

The use of animal experimentation is not only misleading but can be dangerous. According to director of Europeans for Medical Progress, nine out of 10 drugs that have passed the animal testing stage fail human testing, sometimes injuring and killing the participants of the trial.[21] She highlights how even the Handbook of Laboratory Animal Science admits that ‘uncritical reliance on the results of animal tests can be dangerously misleading and has cost the health and lives of tens of thousands of humans’.[22]

The idea that animals are a suitable “stand-in” for human tests is a gross simplification as animal models can never ‘exactly mimic human ones’.[23] Vivisection fails to provide entirely suitable and adequate results, often delaying or impeding medical progress. Studies of animals can never guarantee the safety of drugs because of the ‘fundamental biological, anatomical and biochemical differences’ between humans and animals.[24] Even the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ report, which remains broadly in favour of animal testing, is critical of the assumption all testing is progressive.[25] This section, whilst not presenting a detailed scientific analysis of both sides of the debate, has highlighted the instabilities in the construction of the antivivisectionist. Far from advocating “anti-science”, the arguments of antivivisectionists have a solid base in science and rationality. The construction of vivisectionists as staunch defenders of medicine and progress is also unstable, with frequent cases where animal testing has hindered medical science and posed a serious risk to humankind.

Alternatives to Animal Testing

A second instability in the construction of the discourse is found in the representation of the necessity of vivisection to medical progress. Pharmaceutical companies, politicians and the media frequently represent animal testing as the only means available to them. This convenient “reality” allows them to take the somewhat paradoxical stance of opposing, in principle, the harm caused to animals, yet allows them to continue testing. The Times, for example, epitomises this paradox in an article that on one-hand berates animal rights activists yet still manages to oppose 'the needless suffering of animals'.[26] The pro-vivisection lobby has constructed and reproduced a discourse that presents animal experimentation as the only scientific and practical way of testing, thus representing it as a necessity to medicine. However, this construction not only relies on suppressing the “bad science” of animal testing, as outlined above, but also on marginalising and excluding the non-animal tests that exist and are recommended by various scientific institutions.

The 1950s witness the publication of The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, a crucial contribution to the vivisection debate. Its authors, Russell and Burch, argued that scientists should pursue what has become known as the “3 Rs”, namely: Replacement, Reduction and Refinement. Most anti-vivisectionists would argue that the only worthwhile “R” is that of complete replacement, yet the government’s Animal Procedures Committee provides only a measly £250,000 a year to research alternatives.[27] However, American scientists are starting to realise the financial and ethical opportunities alternatives can offer, with various departments, such as the CAAT, specifically researching the benefits of non-animal options. There are even scientific journals, such as ALTEX and Alternatives to Animal Testing, which focus entirely on the matter of science without harming animals.

Epidemiology (population studies) can help identify the underlying causes of diseases and provide preventative steps to avoid them. Epidemiological studies, for example, alerted scientists to the various factors that can increase the risk of heart disease and highlighted the link between passive smoking and cancer. Specific patient studies are also crucial for medical progress, along with autopsies and biopsies which have been key to our understanding of Alzheimer’s, heart disease and diabetes.[28] Computer models are now sophisticated enough to provide reliable and accurate data with the ability to analyse complex population data, predict the ways in which the body will behave, and simulate drug-tests. Computer AIDS models, for example, have ‘revolutionised medical thinking’ about treatment strategies.[29] Synthetic alternatives and cell cultures can also be of use to medical researchers.

Whilst non-animal alternatives are poorly funded and neglected by many in the mainstream of science, it is simply untrue to suggest that vivisection is the only option if humankind wishes to progress. In many cases the alternatives on offer provide much more reliable and useful data directly applicable to humans. The construction of anti-vivisectionists as dangerous extremists who ignore the desperate need for drug-testing relies upon suppressing the existence of the vast number of alternatives on offer.

Conclusion

The notion that scientific progress is above ethical and moral considerations is disturbing and highly dangerous. Whilst areas of science and medicine have undoubtedly contributed to the general happiness and well-being of society, we should not fall into the trap of using the ends to justify the means. Science should never occur at the expense of ethics. Supporters of animal testing and the ALF may never agree on the ontological worth of animals vis-à-vis humans, yet it is misleading and naïve to construct antivivsectionists as opposing science and progress. Whilst the tactics used by the ALF can at times be abhorrent in the eyes of many, there is genuine concern within scientific communities that animal testing maybe unnecessary, costly and even an obstacle to progress. The construction of identity within the discourse has suppressed the scientific dissent and restricted the possibility of a frank and open discussion. Simply polarising the debate through the construction of logocentric binary opposites, such as rational/irrational and science/anti-science is misleading and dangerous.

The animal testing is debate is often portrayed as a simple dialectic between saving the life of a sick child or the life of an animal. When confronted with such a choice, many would choose the life of the child. Yet the reality is not as simple as this, as this representation relies upon excluding both the dangers and inefficiencies of vivisection and the raft of non-animal alternatives. The simplification of the debate in this manner is dishonest. There is a tendency, however, as Wolff and Boyd highlight, for pro-vivisectionists to present the debate as ‘no animal = no medical progress’.[30] However, as a society we must question what we actually mean by “progress”, what counts as “progress” and whether or not it is a meaningful justification for ethically questionable science. This problem the scientific community must address is the enormous, yet frequently misplaced, prestige that is attributed to animal testing. Vivisection has been elevated to some higher realm of regard, allowing scientists to quickly and easily publish papers and research. Despite the evidence against animal experimentation and the alternatives available, the mainstream scientific community and Big Pharma seem convinced that it is the only suitable means for science. It has, according to the MRMC, become a ‘self-perpetuating’ cycle, where salaries, grants and profits rely upon vivisection. A radical rethink is required, yet this cannot be accomplished whilst opponents are vilified as anti-science, anti-progress and anti-rationality.

Links

Anti-testing/Alternatives to testing:

http://caat.jhsph.edu/
http://altweb.jhsph.edu/
http://www.drhadwentrust.f2s.com/
http://www.buav.org/
http://www.mrmcmed.org/
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/
http://www.navs.org/
http://www.shac.net/
http://www.speakcampaigns.org.uk
http://www.curedisease.net
http://www.stopanimaltests.com/
http://www.dlrm.org/
http://www.frame.org.uk
http://www.peta-online.org/

Pro-testing:

http://www.pro-test.org.uk/
http://www.huntingdon.com/
http://www.medicalprogress.org/
http://www.rds-online.org.uk/

Other:

http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/

Endnotes

[1] Nuffield Council on Bioethics (25/05/2005) The Ethics of Research Using Animals (Short Guide), available online at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/NuffShortReport.pdf, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[2] K. Archibald, (05/05/2006) It’s time to test the testers, available online at http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/comment/story/0,,1767632,00.html, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[3] G. Langley, (22/05/1999) Against, available online at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg16221875.600.html, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[4] T. Blair (14/05/2006) Time to act against animal rights protestors, available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/05/14/nrights214.xml, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[5] A. O’Hagan (10/05/2006) Bunny-lovers abhor the rights of man, available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/05/10/do1003.xml, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[6] Testing times – The pressure must be kept up on animal rights extremists (15/05/2006), available online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,542-2180673,00.html, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[7] Ibid; S. Pfeifer & R. Watts (14/05/2006) ‘We will not be blackmailed’, available on at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/05/14/ccgsk14.xml, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[8] O’Hagan, Bunny-lovers abhor the rights of man
[9] E. Grace (13/05/2006) My year with animal rights extremists, in the Daily Telegraph, p26
[10] Medical Research Modernization Committee (2002) A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, available online at http://www.mrmcmed.org/Critical_Look.pdf, accessed on the 25/05/06, p1.
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid pp2-7
[13] Ibid p9
[14] General Accounting Office (1990) FDA Drug Review: Postapproval Risks 1976-1985, GAO, Washington
[15] Dr Hadwen Trust, What’s Wrong with Animal Experiments?, available online at http://www.drhadwentrust.f2s.com/J_FS-WW_WhatsWrongWithAE.html, accessed on the 25/05/06; BUAV (2003) Animal Models, available online at http://www.buav.org/resources/documents/B2AnimalModels.pdf, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[16] Dr Hadwen Trust, What’s Wrong with Animal Experiments?
[17] Medical Research Modernization Committee, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, p2
[18] CAAT, Frequently Asked Questions, available online at http://altweb.jhsph.edu/faqs.htm, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[19] J. R. Paul (1971) History of Poliomyelitis, Yale University Press, New Haven. Referred to in S. R. Kaufman (1993) Scientific Problems with Animal Models, in Perspectives, Vol.4, available online at http://www.curedisease.com/Perspectives/vol_4_1993/sci-prob.htm, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[20] A. B. Sabin (1984) quoted in S. R. Kaufman (1993) Scientific Problems with Animal Models, in Perspectives, Vol.4, available online at http://www.curedisease.com/Perspectives/vol_4_1993/sci-prob.htm, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[21] Archibald, It’s time to test the testers
[22] Ibid
[23] S. R. Kaufman (1993) Scientific Problems with Animal Models, in Perspectives, Vol.4, available online at http://www.curedisease.com/Perspectives/vol_4_1993/sci-prob.htm, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[24] BUAV (2004) Frequently Asked Questions About Vivisection, available online at http://www.buav.org/resources/documents/A4FAQs.pdf, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[25] Nuffield Council on Bioethics (25/05/2005) The Ethics of Research Using Animals, available online at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf, accessed on the 25/05/06, pxix.
[26] Testing times
[27] Animal Madness (27/01/2001) available online at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg16922750.100.html, accessed on the 25/05/06.
[28] MRMC, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, p13
[29] BUAV (2005) Replacing Animal Experiments, available online at http://www.buav.org/resources/documents/B1-ReplacingAnimalExperiments.pdf, accessed on the 25/05/06, p2
[30] J. Wolff & K. Boyd (11/03/06) Animal Rights and Wrongs, available online at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18925425.300.html, accessed on the 25/05/06.